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Keystone
of American
Foreign
Policy

by
J. Reuben Clark

Introduction by
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THE MONROE DOCTRINE



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The Committee for the Monroe Doctrine was organized October, 1962 to mobilize American public action behind the preservation — and implementation — of the Monroe Doctrine. We are united in the belief that the Doctrine is a basic plank of American foreign policy and must continue as such in the interests of both our national security and freedom in our Hemisphere.

Today, the Monroe Doctrine is in grave jeopardy. By the same token, the security of the nation is jeopardized. A fearful national leadership seems intent on abrogating the Monroe Doctrine in favor of defunct policies of appeasement in the name of temporary expediency.

Through our Committee — and other national organizations — the people of the United States must exercise their historic constitutional prerogative of informing their Congress of the national will to maintain the honor and security of the nation in this critical hour by strict enforcement of the spirit and the letter of the Monroe Doctrine.

The work of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine is supported by private citizens. It was their help that made publication of this brochure possible. We call on all Americans, who agree with us, to join in keeping this work going: by ordering and distributing additional copies of this brochure in your communities; by sending your financial help to our Committee.

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INTRODUCTION

For a century and a half the Monroe Doctrine has been the keystone of American foreign policy. Although, from time to time, criticisms of it have arisen in our counsels, these have been generally limited to specific actions arising out of the Doctrine, not directed against its basic principle. Until the administration of John F. Kennedy, no American President, by word or deed, questioned the Doctrine. But President Kennedy, both by word and by deed, has in effect repudiated it at every juncture of the Cuban crisis.

There can be no doubt that the Castro regime in Cuba represents precisely the type of danger against which the Monroe Doctrine calls for the use of the might of the United States. The Castro government is not simply a home-grown Latin-American dictatorship, arising from a popular revolt against the corruption of a previous regime. It is an arm of the international Communist power machine based in Moscow — an agent not only of a European power, but specifically of an "alien political system," as the Monroe Doctrine called the infinitely less dangerous Holy Alliance of its day. Never since the promulgation of the Doctrine in 1823

has any threat to the hemisphere been so clear and present a danger as this.

Considering these facts, the actions of the Kennedy administration — its pusillanimity at the Bay of Pigs, its retreat after October 1962 from the demand for inspection and from the implicit threat of invasion, its present acquiescence and passivity before Castro, its direct hostility to exile Cuban enemies of the regime — amount to a *de facto* surrender of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

Believing that this repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine is fraught with the most perilous consequences for the Republic and for the hemisphere, the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine is attempting to bring the facts and the implications of the situation before the public. In accordance with this aim, a search has been made for a succinct and effective summation of the meaning of that Doctrine in American history. By far the ablest of such analyses has been found to be the statement printed in this brochure, a statement submitted to the Secretary of State on January 6, 1930, by the then Under-Secretary of State, J. Reuben Clark. So clearly and capably written is this document that it speaks today with the same force as it did three decades ago.

Indeed, there are only two specific questions, both of them arising from circumstances occurring in the years since Mr. Clark wrote, concerning which a few additional words may be necessary to supplement his analysis.

The first of these is the argument that President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy (and the various agreements pursuant to that policy made between the United States and the other Latin American republics) supersedes the Monroe Doctrine and renders it null and void. The truth, however, seems to be the opposite: rather than superseding or negating the Doctrine, that Policy and those agreements strengthened it, by associating the other republics of the hemisphere with its principle, while explicitly reserving to the United States the independent continuation of the policy of 1823.

As the leading historian of the Monroe Doctrine, Professor Dexter Perkins, writes: ". . . in 1938 Cordell Hull reiterated the fundamentals of Monroeism at the conference of Lima, and his words were echoed by Alfred M. Landon, the titular head of the Republican Party at that time. The President's association of Canada with the Doctrine in the same year was, so far as I know, nowhere challenged. By 1940 matters had gone further. At the conference of Havana the no-transfer principle was solemnly con-

firmed in a gathering of all the states of the New World and the solidarity of the republics of the West asserted with the enunciation of the famous declaration that an aggression against any one of them should be considered an aggression against all. The Congress went on record by an overwhelming vote in favor of the first of these two declarations. And in this same year of 1940, the Danish colony of Greenland was brought within the scope of the pronouncement of Monroe. In these various measures was the clearest indication of the loyalty of the American people to the principles of 1823."¹ Never in the years since has any American President or Secretary of State given any indication that the Monroe Doctrine had been weakened or replaced by the other transformations in inter-American relations which have been taking place through the Organization of American States during these decades.

The second argument which has been proposed in recent years for regarding the Doctrine as no longer valid is derived from the establishment of a set of world-wide alliances by the United States for defense against Communism. This amounts, the argument runs, to our "interference" in the affairs of Europe, and therefore to a renunciation of the hemispheric separation upon which the Monroe Doctrine is based. Accordingly, it is claimed, the principle of exclusion of European powers from this hemisphere also falls.

The essential hollowness of this argument becomes apparent the moment one considers the motivation and character of our present-day alliances. These are not "entangling alliances" in Washington's sense, involving us in the internal struggles of Europe. Nor are we concerned with power over other peoples or with territorial acquisition. These alliances and our "involvement" are limited to defense against the clear and present danger of Communist world conquest.

To quote Professor Perkins again: "The sentences of Monroe's message which relate to Europe are cautiously and conservatively phrased. They speak of abstinence from intermeddling in the 'internal affairs' of European powers, and of abstinence from the wars of European countries 'relating to themselves.' There is nothing in these phrases that suggests the fixing of an absolute and an irrevocable standard with regard to diplomatic cooperation with European powers . . . the essential idea behind [the Monroe Doctrine] is even more valid than it was in 1823. Then the danger was illusory, nor, as we have shown, was it every really very great in the nineteenth or even in the early twentieth century. Today the Russian menace has been dramatized by the folly of the

Kremlin; the threat has been recognized; and in principle, if not by direct allusion, the governments of the New World are likely to be governed by the principles enunciated by James Monroe."²

The Monroe Doctrine remains today what it was when it was promulgated — an essential bastion of American security. Never before has it been so imperative that it be enforced, for never before has there existed so grave a hemispheric danger to the United States and all the Americas as the Communist regime in Cuba.

FRANK S. MEYER

June 14, 1963

¹*A History of the Monroe Doctrine*, by Dexter Perkins (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1963), pp. 385-86.

²*Ibid.*, p. 374, 389.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The pertinent parts of the doctrine as announced by President Monroe (December 2, 1823) are these:

" * * * the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

"It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole Nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

"It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."

The doctrine, thus declared by Monroe, when reduced to its lowest terms, covers—

(1) Future colonization by any European powers of the American continents.

(2) Any attempt by the allied powers to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere, or (in its second statement) to any part of either continent.

(3) Any interposition, by any European power, for the purpose of oppressing or controlling in any other manner the destinies of the Latin American Governments “who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and just principles acknowledged.”

(4) Noninterference by the United States with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power.

(5) Policy of leaving Spanish American colonies and Spain to themselves in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.

Behind the doctrine, though not expressly stated in words by President Monroe, is the principle of the complete political separation of Europe and the Americas, or, as Jefferson put it, “Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.” (Oct. 24, 1823.)

The principles of the nonextension of the European political system to this hemisphere and interposition in the affairs of Latin American Republics, are mere corollaries of the political separation of Europe and America.

. . . Each of these essential principles of the Doctrine had been understood, announced, and invoked as between ourselves and Europe, years before the framing of Monroe’s declaration was contemplated.

Jefferson, in 1793, seems clearly to have visualized an America with no European political affiliation.

Washington in his Farewell Address (1796) declared we should have “as little political connection as possible” with Europe, that Europe had a “set of primary interests” with which we had “none or a very remote relation,” wherefore Europe “must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns”; “Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice? It is

our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world."

Adams (1797) in a message to Congress declared, "We ought not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe, but to keep ourselves always distinct and separate from it."

King, our Minister to Great Britain, reported (1798) intimations that Great Britain desired, with our cooperation, to separate South America from Spain—Britain not wishing France to secure the resources of these colonies—and King intimated to British officers that, as to Louisiana, we should be unwilling "it should pass into the hands of new proprietors."

King (1801) speaking of the Floridas, told Hawkesbury "we should be unwilling to see them transferred except to ourselves."

Madison, Secretary of State (1801), informed Pinckney at Madrid that the United States never had favored and could never favor the transfer to Great Britain of the Spanish possessions on the Mississippi, and this instruction had the assent of President Jefferson. . . .

King (early 1803) informed Addington of the British Government that we would "with much concern" see New Orleans in British possession. Hawkesbury (1803) speaking of our purchase of Louisiana, stated he had "received his Majesty's commands to express to you the pleasure with which His Majesty has received this intelligence." Jefferson (1803) in a message to Congress, observed that a "wide ocean" separated us from the entangling "political interests" of Europe, that "it cannot be the interest of any to assail us, nor ours to disturb them," a position we should be "most unwise * * * to cast away."

The Congress of the United States in 1811 passed a resolution, which, while dealing with a restricted territorial area, invoked our "security, tranquillity, and commerce." This resolution reads:

"Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American provinces; and considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and commerce: Therefore,

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the United States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power, and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory; they, at the

same time, declare that the said territory shall, in their hands, remain subject to future negotiation."

In 1820, Secretary Adams instructing Middleton at St. Petersburg, affirmed that the political system of the United States was essentially "extra-European," and "that for the repose of Europe as well as of America, the European and American political system should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible."

Beginning in 1821, Adams continued his correspondence with Russia in the course of which he developed, as it appears for the first time, the anti-European colonization principle, which was crystallized in his statement on July 17, 1822, that "we should assume distinctly the principle that the American Continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."

Later (July 22, 1823) Adams instructed Middleton to say "frankly and explicitly to the Russian Government, that the future peace of the world, and the interests of Russia herself cannot be promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the American Continent."

The situation as to Cuba in 1823 is said to have called forth a remark from Clay to Canning that "we would fight" if Britain were to secure possession of Cuba. . . .

On August 20, 1823, Mr. Canning sent a "private and confidential" communication to Mr. Rush suggesting that Great Britain and the United States "might understand each other as to the Spanish-American colonies." He stated:

"For ourselves we have no disguise.

"1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

"2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent states, to be one of time and circumstances.

"3. We, are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiation.

"4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.

"5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference.

"If these opinions and feelings are, as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other and to declare them in the face of the world?"

In a subsequent paragraph Mr. Canning inquired whether Mr. Rush was authorized to enter into negotiations and sign a convention upon this subject.

In a later communication marked "private and confidential" (August 23, 1823) Mr. Canning informed Mr. Rush that he found as a further reason for the two Governments reaching the proposed understanding, the fact that the French expected as soon as their military objects in Spain were achieved to propose "a Congress, or some more or less formal concert and consultation, specially upon the affairs of Spanish America."

President Monroe, on October 17, 1823 wrote to Mr. Jefferson and to Mr. Madison, enclosing copies of this correspondence, and stated among other things:

"My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British Govt. and to make it known, that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us."

Mr. Jefferson replying under date of October 24, 1823, stated among other things. . . .

"I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed, that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country; but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, cession or acquisition in any other way."

The foregoing sets out, as to principles involved, the general situation when Monroe's Cabinet began its deliberations early in November of 1823. It will be observed that every essential principle of the declaration as finally framed had been definitely stated, some of the principles over and over again, before the Cabinet began consideration of the matter. The only thing left for the Cabinet to do and the only thing which the Cabinet did was to frame the formulas by which the principles should be announced.

Much research and learning have been exhausted in an effort to place or distribute, as among Adams, Monroe, Canning, and Rush, the credit for conceiving the principles of the declaration. From what has been said it would appear that neither Adams nor Monroe had any closer connection with this doctrine than Jefferson had

with the Declaration of Independence, except as to the colonization principle, which Mr. Adams seems to have developed. In each case, the drawing of the instrument was the work of the draftsman; the principles cast into definite formulas in the doctrine had long been the common property of the American statesmen of the time, and even of European statesmen.

Returning to the declaration itself, it must not be overlooked that the matters inhibited by the doctrine came under ban because they were "dangerous to our peace and safety," or were a "manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States," or "endangering our peace and happiness."

This is the language used in international correspondence to describe matters which challenge the security or self-preservation of a nation. From the time when the announcement of the doctrine was made to the present time, substantially equivalent expressions have been used to describe the doctrine and the principles which underlie it. No reasonable doubt can be sustained that it has always been considered as involving our security. Secretary Knox speaking in 1911, declared:

" * * * The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is considered by us essential to our peace, prosperity, and national safety."

In 1914 Senator Elihu Root declared:

"The doctrine is not international law but it rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by international law."

Conceiving it as a doctrine touching our self-preservation (and the incidents of its application are squarely within the precedents of action for self-preservation) the definitions and discussions of self-preservation by international law writers are of importance.

Concerning self-preservation Phillimore says—

"The right of self-preservation is the first law of nations, as it is of individuals.

"All means which do not affect the independence of other nations are lawful for this end. No nation has a right to prescribe to another what these means shall be, or to require any account of her conduct in this respect." ("International Law," 3d ed., vol. I, p. 312.)

After stating, as to the independence of a state, that "to interfere with it therefore is a wrong, unless it can be shown that there are rights or duties which have priority, either invariably or in certain circumstances, over the duty of respecting independence," Hall

lays down the following rule:

"That there is one such right is incontestable. Even with individuals living in well-ordered communities the right of self-preservation is absolute in the last resort. A fortiori it is so with states, which have in all cases to protect themselves. If the safety of a state is gravely and immediately threatened either by occurrences in another state, or aggression prepared there, which the government of the latter is unable or professes itself to be unable, to prevent, or when there is an imminent certainty that such occurrences or aggression will take place if measures are not taken to forestall them, the circumstances may fairly be considered to be such as to place the right of self-preservation above the duty of respecting a freedom of action which must have become nominal, on the supposition that the state from which the danger comes is willing, if it can, to perform its international duties." ("International Law," 5th ed., p. 54.)

Wheaton declares:

"Of the absolute international rights of states, one of the most essential and important, and that which lies at the foundation of all the rest, is the right of self-preservation. It is not only a right with respect to other states, but a duty with respect to its own members, and the most solemn and important which the state owes to them. This right necessarily involves all other incidental rights, which are essential as means to give effect to the principal end." ("Elements of International Law," par. 61.)

Westlake lays down the rule thus:

"What we take to be pointed out by justice as the true international right of self-preservation is merely that of self-defense. A state may defend itself, by preventive means if in its conscientious judgment necessary, against attack by another state, threat of attack or preparations or other conduct from which an intention to attack may reasonably be apprehended. In so doing it will be acting in a manner intrinsically defensive even though externally aggressive. In attack we include all violation of the legal right of itself or of its subjects, whether by the offending state or by its subjects without due repression by it, or ample compensation when the nature of the case admits compensation. And by due repression we intend such as will effectually prevent all but trifling injuries (*de minimis non curat lex*), even though the want of such repression may arise from the powerlessness of the government in question. The conscientious judgment of the state acting on the right thus allowed must necessarily stand in the place of authoritative sanction, so long as the present imperfect organization of the world continues. If its legal rights or those of its subjects are con-

cerned, and the necessity is not great and immediate, action on the right of self-preservation will seldom be conscientious unless arbitration has first been offered and refused; and there may be cases of a political kind not wholly unfitted for arbitration." ("International Law," pt. I, pp. 299-300.)

Oppenheim says:

"From the earliest time of the existence of the Law of Nations self-preservation was considered sufficient justification for many acts of a state which violate other states. Although, as a rule, all states are under a mutual duty to respect one another's personality, and are therefore bound not to violate one another, as an exception certain violations of another state committed by a state for the purpose of self-preservation are not prohibited by the Law of Nations." ("International Law," vol. I, par. 129.)

Rivier announces the rule thus:

"When a conflict arises between the right of self-preservation of a state and the duty of that state to respect the right of another, the right of self-preservation over-rides the duty. *Primum vivere*. A man may be free to sacrifice himself. It is never permitted to a government to sacrifice the state of which the destinies are confided to it. The government is then authorized, and even in certain circumstances bound, to violate the right of another country for the safety (*salut*) of its own. That is the excuse of necessity, an application of the reason of state. It is a legitimate excuse." (Translation of "*Principes du Droit des Gens*," p. 277, as given by Westlake in "International Law," pt. I, pp. 296-297.)

The occasions when this right has been exercised are many. The more frequently cited instances have been summarized as follows:

Those classed as acts of self-defense:

"Halleck (p. 96) and Phillimore (p. 561) cite the intervention of the powers in the French Revolution in the latter part of the 18th century as illustrations of the exercise of this right (Halleck apparently reprobating and Phillimore justifying the intervention). Phillimore also classifies under this head the intervention of the powers in the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, 1795, and 1815, interventions which he characterizes as 'public crimes' and 'national wickedness' (p. 563). Phillimore also classifies under this head as being the 'offspring of necessity' the intervention of the powers in Greece in 1856 (p. 567), and also quotes at least one earlier exercise of the right in the 'conduct of Hiero, King of Syracuse, who, though an ally of Rome, sent aid to Carthage during the war of the auxiliaries' (p. 576).

"Lawrence seems also to classify the British intervention in Egypt in 1882 under the head of self-defense (p. 133).

"The authorities appear to regard this kind of intervention variously. Halleck states that this usually is a mere 'excuse' (p. 96). Phillimore contends that 'in cases like the foregoing (that is, the intervention in the French Revolution)' the right of self-defense justifies other nations in intervening and demanding and if necessary by force of arms compelling, the abolition of a government avowing a principle of hostility to the existing governments of all other nations. But this, like the other grounds of intervention, is very liable to be abused' (citing the partitions of Poland, p. 562)." . . .

Those classed as acts of self-preservation:

"Hall, Phillimore, and Oppenheim treat the subject of 'Self-Preservation' as distinct from the question of intervention, Phillimore, indeed, specifying as one of the grounds of intervention the closely allied 'Right of Self-Defense.' All three authors (Phillimore, p. 315; Hall, p. 265; Oppenheim, p. 180) cite the case of the destruction, in 1839, of the *Caroline* on the Niagara River by British forces crossing over into American territory as an instance of the exercise of this right. Phillimore adds (p. 315) the instance of the British Government sending troops to Portugal in 1826 (Portugal being her ally) in order to assist Portugal in meeting the mustering and equipment of Portuguese rebels on the Spanish frontier unchecked by the Spanish authorities. Hall (p. 268) and Oppenheim (p. 179) cite the seizure by the British forces in 1807 of the Danish fleet, which, under certain secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, was to be used by France against England. Hall (p. 270) also cites in this connection the case of the *Virginius*, where Spain exercised the right of visit and search during the insurrection in Cuba, a state of belligerency not having been recognized. In the case of the *Virginius* the United States and Great Britain both protested against the summary execution of certain of their citizens and subjects found on board the vessel. Oppenheim (p. 180) also cites the case of Amelia Island, whose piratical inhabitants were put down by this Government because of their preying upon American commerce as an instance of this kind. . . .

Those classed as acts of imminent danger:

"Lawrence (p. 121), seemingly having in mind much the same idea as that covered by Hall and others under the heading of 'Self-Preservation,' instances the action of the British Government when, in 1804, the British Ministry discovered that Spain had entered into arrangements to assist France, then at war with England, and was

preparing a naval armament in the harbor of Ferrol, and states that the Ministry were justified in commencing hostilities when their remonstrances were disregarded. Lawrence also instances the case of Austria in 1813, when that government, at the close of an armistice granted by Napoleon after the Battle of Bautzen, "joined Russia and Prussia against France, the reason being that the French emperor had rejected its (Austria's) offers of mediation on the basis of reasonable concessions on his part, and had brought up the army of Italy to intimidate it."

It is of first importance to have in mind that Monroe's declaration in its terms, relates solely to the relationships between European states on the one side, and on the other side, the American Continents, the Western Hemisphere, and the Latin American Governments which on December 2, 1823, had declared and maintained their independence which we had acknowledged.

It is of equal importance to note, on the other hand, that the declaration does not apply to purely inter-American relations.

Nor does the declaration purport to lay down any principles that are to govern the interrelationship of the states of this Western Hemisphere as among themselves.

The doctrine states a case of United States versus Europe, not of United States versus Latin America.

Such arrangements as the United States has made, for example, with Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua, are not within the doctrine as it was announced by Monroe. They may be accounted for as the expression of a national policy which, like the doctrine itself, originates in the necessities of security or self-preservation—a policy which was foreshadowed by Buchanan (1860) and by Salisbury (1895), and was outlined in what is known as the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1905) in connection with the Dominican debt protocol of 1904; but such arrangements are not covered by the terms of the doctrine itself.

Should it become necessary to apply a sanction for a violation of the doctrine as declared by Monroe, that sanction would run against the European power offending the policy, and not against the Latin American country which was the object of the European aggression, unless a conspiracy existed between the European and the American states involved.

In the normal case, the Latin American state against which aggression was aimed by a European power, would be the beneficiary of the doctrine not its victim. This has been the history of its application. The doctrine makes the United States a guarantor, in effect, of the independence of Latin American states, though with-

out the obligations of a guarantor to those states, for the United States itself determines by its sovereign will when, where, and concerning what aggressions it will invoke the doctrine, and by what measures, if any, it will apply a sanction. In none of these things has any other state any voice whatever.

Furthermore while the Monroe Doctrine as declared, has no relation in its terms to an aggression by any other state than a European state, yet the principle "self-preservation" which underlies the doctrine—which principle, as we shall see, is as fully operative without the doctrine as with it—would apply to any non-American state in whatever quarter of the globe it lay, or even to an American state, if the aggressions of such state against other Latin American states were "dangerous to our peace and safety," or were a "manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States," or were "endangering our peace and happiness"; that is, if such aggressions challenged our existence.

In other words, there is a broad domain occupied by self-preservation which is incapable of definite boundary as to its extent, or of definition as to the kind of act which lies within it, because new conditions, new advances in the arts and sciences, new instrumentalities of international contact and communication, new political theories and combinations, vary from age to age and cannot be certainly foretold. As the law stands, whatever falls within the necessities of self-preservation, under existing or future conditions, lies within the boundaries of the domain of the principle.

By his declaration President Monroe occupied and bounded but a narrow portion of this whole domain—that portion which contained situations immediately threatening. But that can hardly be said to have changed under the rules and principles of international law the fundamental character of the acts defined and bounded. These acts still remained within the domain of self-preservation, for, obviously, if they would constitute a menace to our existence, such menace would not disappear by virtue of their being listed.

In this view, the Monroe Doctrine as such might be wiped out and the United States would lose nothing of its broad, international right; it would still possess, in common with every other member of the family of nations, the internationally recognized right of self-preservation, and this right would fully attach to the matters specified by the doctrine if and whenever they threatened our existence, just as the right would attach in relation to any other act carrying a like menace.

The doctrine has been useful, and such indeed was the real motive of its announcement, and it will remain of such use that it

should never be abandoned, as a forewarning to European powers as to what this country would regard, in a restricted field, as inimical to its safety. It has been equally useful to the Americas as forecasting our attitude toward certain international problems and relations in which they might be involved.

But, recalling that the doctrine is based upon the recognized right of self-preservation, it follows (it is submitted) that by the specification of a few matters in the doctrine, the United States has not surrendered its right to deal, as it may be compelled, and under the rules and principles of international law, with the many others which are unspecified as these may arise, which others might, indeed, have been included in the declaration with as much propriety, legally, as those which were mentioned. By naming either one act or a series of acts which challenges our self-preservation, we do not estop ourselves from naming others as they may arise; otherwise the mention of one such act would foreclose all others. The custom of nations shows that invoking the right as to one menace does not foreclose a power from invoking it as to others.

Moreover, by specifying a few of the world powers which, if they performed the prohibited acts, would bring themselves within the inhibitions of the doctrine, the United States has not estopped itself from asserting the same principles against other and unnamed powers making the same sort of aggression. That against these other powers, the United States might, in its intervention, speak of the right of self-preservation and not of the Monroe Doctrine, would neither enlarge nor diminish its rights under international law as to the Monroe Doctrine or otherwise.

It is evident from the foregoing that the Monroe Doctrine is not an equivalent for self-preservation; and therefore the Monroe Doctrine need not, indeed should not, be invoked in order to cover situations challenging our self-preservation but not within the terms defined by Monroe's declaration. These other situations may be handled, and more wisely so, as matters affecting the national security and self-preservation of the United States as a great power.

It has been sometimes contended (see particularly the speech in the Senate by Senator Calhoun in 1848 regarding the situation in Yucatan) that the doctrine was announced merely to meet the threatened aggressions of the European Alliance in 1823, and that the doctrine became obsolete with the passing of this immediate threat. But this view is not supported by the language of the declaration which as to action "by any European power" (both as

to colonization and interposition) is unlimited in time; nor by that part of the declaration which specifically mentions the "allied powers" for here the declaration is couched in such general terms as to be, with sound reason, applied to any power or powers whatsoever who should, at any time, commit the aggressions against which the announced policy was aimed.

During the period since the doctrine was announced there have been assertions at various times as to situations which were not objectionable to the doctrine or to the principles underlying the same. In few of these instances has it been categorically asserted that the Monroe Doctrine did not cover the specific matter in question, the ruling or declaration having usually come in the form of a statement to the effect that some particular situation was not inimical to the interests of the United States.

The statement of the doctrine itself that "with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere," has been more than once reiterated.

It has also been announced that the Monroe Doctrine is not a pledge by the United States to other American states requiring the United States to protect such states, at their behest, against real or fancied wrongs inflicted by European powers, nor does it create an obligation running from the United States to any American state to intervene for its protection.

Mr. Clay in 1828 asserted that the Monroe Doctrine was not applicable to wars as between American states, and it was likewise very early declared by Mr. Clay (1825) "that whilst the war is confined to the parent country and its former colony, the United States remain neutral, extending their friendship and doing equal justice to both parties."

Beginning in the second half of the last century (1861) the United States took the position that it would consider that Spain was "manifesting an unfriendly spirit toward the United States" if it should undertake the resubjection of certain of her former colonies, and this position was reiterated at later dates.

Commencing with 1825 and running on down through the whole of the last century it was repeatedly asserted that the Monroe Doctrine did not require the United States to prevent Europe from waging war against Latin American countries, and from almost as early a period down to the close of the century the principle was followed (as announced by Secretary Sherman in 1898) that it was not the duty of the United States "to protect its American neighbors from the responsibilities which attend the exercise of

independent sovereignty."

The United States has at times jointly intervened with European countries in internal situations existing in the Latin Americas; at other times it has declined to participate in such intervention.

A popular feeling exists that the Monroe Doctrine is hostile to monarchical government as such, but this is not the fact. Monarchies have been set up in Brazil, Haiti, and Mexico without objection by the United States, and for many years we dealt with the Brazilian monarchy on terms and in language of sincere friendship. Even the establishment of the Maximilian Empire in Mexico was objected to not so much from the point of view of its being a monarchy as from the point of view that this monarchy was established and maintained by European troops.

One of the interesting suggestions that have been made by European powers is that the possession of colonies by that power upon this hemisphere makes of that possessing power an American state. This suggestion has, of course, not been acceptable to the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine has always been considered as covering a possession—either "temporary or permanent" (Forsyth, 1840)—of American territory by European powers, and in line with that principle, we have declared that the Monroe Doctrine forbade the occupation of American territory by such powers. President Roosevelt in his message of February 15, 1905, in relation to the situation in Santo Domingo, declared:

"An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in adjustment of its disputes with American states, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise."

At various times proposals have been made that the United States should join with Europe in neutralizing certain areas (notably Cuba) on this continent, but the United States has steadily declined to join in such an action. One of the classic notes that have been written regarding the relationship between the United States and the other Americas was penned by Secretary Everett on December 1, 1852, regarding a proposal to neutralize Cuba.

The so-called Roosevelt corollary was to the effect, as generally understood, that in case of financial or other difficulties in weak Latin American countries, the United States should attempt an adjustment thereof lest European governments should intervene, and intervening should occupy territory—an act which would be contrary to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. This view seems

to have had its inception in some observations of President Buchanan in his message to Congress of December 3, 1860, and was somewhat amplified by Lord Salisbury in his note to Mr. Olney of November 6, 1895, regarding the Venezuelan boundary dispute.

As has already been indicated above, it is not believed that this corollary is justified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, however much it may be justified by the application of the doctrine of self-preservation.

These various expressions and statements, as made in connection with the situations which gave rise to them, detract not a little from the scope popularly attached to the Monroe Doctrine, and they relieve that doctrine of many of the criticisms which have been aimed against it.

Finally, it should not be overlooked that the United States declined the overtures of Great Britain in 1823 to make a joint declaration regarding the principles covered by the Monroe Doctrine, or to enter into a conventional arrangement regarding them. Instead, this Government determined to make the declaration of high national policy on its own responsibility and in its own behalf. The doctrine is thus purely unilateral. The United States determines when and if the principles of the doctrine are violated, and when and if violation is threatened. We alone determine what measures, if any, shall be taken to vindicate the principles of the doctrine, and we of necessity determine when the principles have been vindicated. No other power of the world has any relationship to, or voice in, the implementing of the principles which the doctrine contains. It is our doctrine, to be by us invoked and sustained, held in abeyance, or abandoned as our high international policy or vital national interests shall seem to us, and to us alone, to demand.

It may, in conclusion, be repeated: The doctrine does not concern itself with purely inter-American relations; it has nothing to do with the relationship between the United States and other American nations, except where other American nations shall become involved with European governments in arrangements which threaten the security of the United States, and even in such cases, the doctrine runs against the European country, not the American nation, and the United States would primarily deal thereunder with the European country and not with the American nation concerned. The doctrine states a case of the United States versus Europe, and not of the United States versus Latin America. Furthermore, the fact should never be lost to view that in applying this doctrine during the period of 100 years since it was announced, our Government has over and over again driven it in as a shield between Europe and the Americas to protect Latin America from the political and territorial thrusts of Europe; and this was done at times when the

American nations were weak and struggling for the establishment of stable, permanent governments; when the political morality of Europe sanctioned, indeed encouraged, the acquisition of territory by force; and when many of the great powers of Europe looked with eager, covetous eyes to the rich, undeveloped areas of the American hemisphere. Nor should another equally vital fact be lost sight of, that the United States has only been able to give this protection against designing European powers because of its known willingness and determination, if and whenever necessary, to expend its treasure and to sacrifice American life to maintain the principles of the doctrine. So far as Latin America is concerned, the doctrine is now, and always has been, not an instrument of violence and oppression, but an unbought, freely bestowed, and wholly effective guarantee of their freedom, independence, and territorial integrity against the imperialistic designs of Europe.

December 17, 1928.

J. REUBEN CLARK.

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"... we should consider any attempt (on the part of foreign governments) to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

— President James Monroe, December 2, 1823.